This paper provides an original study into how democratization and globalization influence transnational terrorism -examining the motives of terrorists and how democratic institutions and international integration influence non-state economic actors. We employ a gravity model to investigate the relative importance of globalization and democratization on transnational terrorism and external conflict. We construct an original database of over 200,000 observations from 1968-2003 for 189 countries, to examine the extent to which economic, political and historical factors influence the likelihood of citizens from one country to engage in terrorist activities against another. We find that the advent of democratic institutions, high income and more openness in a source country significantly reduces conflict. However, the advent of these same positive developments in targeted countries actually increases conflict. Ceteris paribus, the impact of being a democracy or participating in the WTO/IMF for a source country decreases the number of terrorist strikes by about 2 to 3 per year, which is more than two standard deviations greater than the average number of strikes between any two countries in a given year.
INTRODUCTION
The "liberal peace" hypothesis alleges that democracies are less likely to engage in militarized disputes with each other, that they are less likely to initiate con ‡icts with other democracies, and when they do, they allocate signi…cantly more resources to the con ‡ict than other polities (Bueno de Mesquita et al.1999) . Democracies trade more with each other, and are more cooperative with respect to multilateral trading arrangements by forming trade blocs and joining PTAs (Mans…eld, Milner and Rosendor¤ 2002, Rosendor¤ 2006) . Countries that trade more with each other are also less likely to engage in militarized disputes Pevehouse 2000, Bearce et al. 1999) . Conversely, countries that are con ‡ict-prone deter trade and investment and experience slower growth (Blomberg et al 2004 , Blomberg and Hess 2005a , 2005b . This association between trade, con ‡ict and democracy has been a central concern of scholars in international relations, working to establish the precise causal processes and mechanisms. How these dynamics …t together has been a subject of signi…cant dispute among scholars in the …eld.
In the recent period however, an alternative form of cross-border con ‡ict has garnered closer attention -transnational terrorism 1 . While terrorism is not war waged between states per se, it has many of the similar features -it is a cross-national violent process that threatens people and property, with attendant political and economic consequences. Moreover, observers have argued that terrorism is responsive to changes in the same underlying variables: democracies are less prone to terrorism, and terrorism is a response to increased globalization. This paper investigates the links between democracy, commercial integration and terrorism in a systematic manner.
These themes have dominated public debate with regards to current US foreign policy. The Bush administration for instance insists that the instillation of democracy in the Arab world will stem the ‡ow of anti-American terrorism, and increase the security of US assets and people, both at home and abroad. President Bush's speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars annual meeting in August 2005 explicitly equates "peace"with "freedom". Chuck Hagel (2004) , Republican US senator from Nebraska, in an article in Foreign A¤airs argues that the war on terrorism must be guided by principles that expand democracy abroad. While it is not clear where this hypothesis emerges from, one likely candidate is the administration's reading of the literature on the democratic peace. Similarly, the US National Intelligence Council 's 2005 report argues that globalization is a source of insecurity for the US; the New York
Times'columnist Thomas Friedman in his recent popular tract alleges that a " ‡atter"
world (one without hurdles or barriers for the ‡ow of resources) makes transnational terrorism more likely adds to the popular view that globalization and terrorism are linked (Friedman 2005) .
The questions however remain -does democracy abroad reduce the ‡ow of terrorism and does increased globalization make terrorism more likely? Key to an answer to this question is to realize there are two sets of issues at work -what are the characteristics relevant to a country as a target, and do democracy and commercial integration matter as characteristics of the source country?
In this paper we bring a methodology from the literature in international trade, and apply it to another ‡ow across international borders -that of transnational terrorism.
Using a dyadic approach akin to the gravity model of empirical international trade we simultaneously explore the determinants of terrorism in both source and target countries. We show that the e¤ects of democracy and globalization di¤er depending on whether the country is a source or target state. Democracy in the source reduces the incidence of terrorism while in the target state, democracy raises terrorist inci-dence. Commercial openness in source country reduces terrorism, while increases it in target countries.
Terrorism and Global Trends
World foreign direct investment ‡ows (FDI), which amounted to less than $13 While the run-up of FDI, trade and democracy in the 1990s, and especially in the second half of that decade, has several explanations, it is strikingly correlated with a decline in transnational terrorism during that period. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, approximately 1.5 transnational terrorist events occurred every day. As globalization and democratization grew at an ever faster rate, the frequency of terrorist events declined sharply, reaching less than 0.5 events a day by 2000. Did this shift toward a more integrated and democratic world contribute to the large increase in peace during that same period?
In order to understand the e¤ects that democracy and globalization might have on terrorist activity, we need an underlying view of the decision-theoretic mechanisms that determine terrorist choices. We de…ne terrorism as the premeditated or threatened use of extra-normal violence to obtain a political, religious or ideological objective through the intimidation of a large audience. We assume that terrorists are rational actors, choosing strategies to maximize the chance of success with respect to particular objectives, taking full account of the constraints under which they operate (Sandler et al.1983 ). The levels of activity undertaken, and the location in which they occur depend on the costs, bene…ts and resources available. Higher costs mean fewer activities; higher bene…ts and resources imply more activity.
2 Enders and Sandler (1993) establish that terrorists respond to changes in incentives.
An increase in the cost of one mode of operation across the international system (metal detectors in airports, for example) leads to changes in terrorist operations (fewer skyjackings), and an increase in other modes. Democracy and globalization work to in ‡uence terrorist activity through all three avenues -costs, bene…ts and resources.
Terrorism and Democracy
Democracy, it is often alleged, provides a set of rules that facilitate the peaceful resolution of political con ‡icts. It o¤ers access to the powerful decision makers and political institutions for citizens to seek redress for their grievances. It makes political organization cheaper and lowers the costs of (legitimate) political action making illegal activities relatively more expensive, and therefore in expectation less terrorist violence.
On the other hand, key to the success of any terrorist act is recruitment and organization -both of which are made easier in environments with civil liberties, freedom of religion, association and movement. All these are characteristic of democracies, of course. Moreover the terrorist act must spread fear and anxiety through the population at large -facilitated by a free and well functioning press, freedom of speech; also characteristic of democracy.
2 An additional concern for any terrorist organization is the e¤ect of their actions on recruitment of future cadres (Rosendor¤ and Sandler 2004) .
In an early paper, Eubank and Weinberg (1994) …nd that terrorist groups are more frequently hosted by democratic societies. Following Sandler (1995) , Eubank and Weinberg (2001) …nd that terrorist events occur more frequently in stable democratic countries. Similarly, Li and Schaub (2004) …nd more incidents in democratic countries. It may not be democracy per se at work; the experience of less democratic or newly democratizing countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that the transitional period between authoritarianism and democracy is a particularly susceptible one for terrorist activity (Eubank and Weinberg 1998) .
Other evidence associating the link between democracy and transnational terrorism is mixed. Li (2005) attempts to disaggregate the many dimensions "democracy";
he …nds that voter turnout reduces terrorist incidents in that country, but that constraints on government authority increase incidents; press freedom raises incidents.
Overall, the e¤ect of democracy on terrorism is unclear.
Assessing the motives of terrorists leads little insight. While the targets of terrorism are more frequently democracies, rarely is the terrorist's manifesto one of installing democracy in their home countries; rather it is often about removing foreign military occupation and self-determination (Pape 2005) .
The e¤ects of democracy on a country's likelihood of being a source for transnational terrorism are not …rmly established. Non-democracies create fewer outlets for political grievances to be addressed, making violent means of political action more likely. This might lead to increased domestic terrorism, but doesn't speak to the country as a source of transnational terrorism. When the autocratic government is perceived to have its authority bolstered by its foreign relations with democracies however, we might expect the terrorist group advocating the removal of the illegitimate autocrat may indeed target its foreign allies, some of whom may be democracies.
We might expect therefore that non-democracy abroad could increase transnational terrorism at home.
As to what makes a country a source of terrorists, there is little evidence of any kind. Overall, the lack of clarity on the issue stems, in our view, from treating the source and target countries in the same manner; when the e¤ects of democracy are permitted to di¤er conditional on whether the observation is a source or target, allows a more precise view on the determinants of transnational terrorism.
Globalization and Terrorism
Globalization also a¤ects the costs, bene…ts and resources available for terrorist activities. Firstly if terrorism emerges from a sense of relative deprivation, then globalization, in so far that it encourages economic growth, may mitigate terrorist tendencies. On the other hand, if globalization is associated with increased inequality across countries and groups, then we might expect globalization to lead to more violence. On the costs side of the equation, the lowered barriers to ‡ows of goods, money, people and ideas, makes the networks of terrorist operations cheaper to operate. Terrorist themselves …nd it easier to move across increasingly permeable borders;
resource ‡ows across borders necessary to …nance terrorist operations become more di¢ cult to monitor by authorities overwhelmed by the growth of the international …nancial system. Norms of privacy in international banking make information about these resource ‡ows scarce. The fact that customs agents inspect only a small fraction of goods imported make the smuggling of terrorist materiel cheaper, while the freer ‡ow of information make the knowledge and techniques of terrorist action more easily transferred. Globalization, like democracy, a¤ects the costs, bene…ts and resources constrains of terrorists in many ways. The literature has focused on some of these mechanisms and the evidence has been substantially inconclusive.
The popular discourse seems to put some of the blame for transnational terrorism what certain terrorist groups might see as "bad" products and "good" products or investments. Moreover, the same advances in technology that allow for easy access of goods and services also allow for easy access to military hardware and technology.
In short run, globalization may have the consequence of creating a series of winners and losers. These same losers will have easier access to retaliate in response to their loses thereby multiplying the e¤ect of globalization on terrorism.
An alternative view put forth by Crenshaw (2001) is that it is naive to believe that globalization is encouraging international terrorism. So that while globalization and terrorism may be seemingly impacting one another, there is something more complicated at work. Put di¤erently, the latest incidence of terrorism is not necessarily driven by globalization. Instead, the latest wave of terrorism should be seen as a series of civil wars which may be motivated by a strategically uni…ed reaction to American power, rather than directly to globalization.
In a pooled cross-section analysis of globalization and transnational terrorism Li and Schaub (2004) explore some of these links. On the one hand reduced transaction costs of international trade and …nance make terracing terrorist funds a di¢ cult task, and reducing the e¤ective costs of …nancing terrorist activity. Likewise as trade accelerates, illegal smuggling becomes cheaper, permitting weapons to travel with a higher chance of not being intercepted. On the other hand, if globalization and growth are associated, terrorism, a problem of underdevelopment and poverty, will take care of itself. Li and Schaub use the ITERATE data set (Mickolus et al. 2002) of 112 countries from 1975-1997. They …nd that international trade and investment have little e¤ect on the number of terrorist events.
Others argue that globalization encourages terrorism for yet further reasons. If globalization increases world inequality, then it will increase feelings of relative deprivation. These feelings produce political action, some of it violent. Or merely, globalization results in a kind of cultural imperialization signi…cantly reducing the quality of life of people committed to a particular set of norms governing social behavior, norms that are broken by foreign in ‡uences.
Dyads and the Gravity Model
How then can we possibly make sense of these con ‡icting theoretical claims, and the even less satisfying empirical record? Here we make use of the concept of the "directed dyad" which di¤erentiates explicitly between the characteristics of the state that is the source of the terrorist activity and the state that is the target. By separating out the e¤ects of democracy and globalization on the source and target states we generate much clearer and precise hypotheses and results than are available using standard panel regression techniques.
We start by focusing our attention on "transnational terrorism"and then to recognize that this type of terrorism is fundamentally dyadic in nature. Hence it is amenable to investigation using an approach similar to the gravity of model of international trade.
Our focus is on the determinants of transnational terrorism. Following the definition adopted by Mickolus et al (2002) , a transnational terrorist event is de…ned as "the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes, by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established government authority, when such action is intended to in ‡uence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its rami…cations transcend national boundaries"(page 2, italics ours).
Transnational terrorism requires therefore, a ‡ow of resources across international borders -whether it is foreign terrorists attacking domestic (and other foreign) targets, or domestic nationals attacking the property and lives of foreign nationals on domestic soil. As a result it seems appropriate in any investigation of the determinants of transnational terrorism, to consider the characteristics of both the source and target countries. Moreover, the characteristics of a country that might make it a likely target country may indeed be very di¤erent from the characteristics that make a country a likely source of international terrorism. The features of the polity that make a country a terrorist-producer may be di¤erent from the political structures, institutions and environment that make a state terrorist target.
We adopt here an explicitly dyadic approach, and we follow the insights drawn from international economics. A country's willingness to engage in international tradeto import and export -depend on key features of both the underlying economies.
Following Heckscher-Ohlin, a country's trading patterns (whether it is an importer or exporter of a particular good) depends crucially on its factor endowments, relative to its trading partner. A country relatively well endowed with a particular factor will export goods that use that factor intensively. We draw the obvious analogy when considering transnational terrorism -what matters are the underlying political conditions present in both the sending and receiving country, not just in the country in which the event took place, or the nationalities of the victims.
For several decades, the most frequently used empirical speci…cation for linking trade volumes with underlying economic conditions is known as the gravity modelwhich is in turn an analogy borrowed from physics. When considering the ‡ow of gravitational force between two bodies, it has long been understood that this depends on the mass of the two bodies and the distance between them. From international trade theory (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003a , 2003b , Deardor¤ 1984 , the volume of trade between two countries depends on the size of their economies and physical distance between them. This speci…cation has been further re…ned by adding variables such as income per capita, language di¤erences, the regime types of the two countries.
In this paper we claim that the ‡ow of transnational terrorism between states similarly depends on the incomes of the two countries, the distance between them, language di¤erences, the regime types of the two states, and a number of other variables that describe the underlying economic and political conditions of both states. We …nd that di¤erences in income, democracy and openness go a long way into explaining transnational terrorism. We …nd the advent of democratic institutions in a source country signi…cantly reduces con ‡ict. However, the advent of these same institutions in host countries actually increases con ‡ict.
We also …nd that source-country openness has a negative and statistically significant impact on con ‡ict. Once again, however, host-country openness often has a positive and statistically signi…cant on con ‡ict. Ceteris paribus, the impact of being a democracy or participating in the WTO for a source country decreases the number of terrorist strikes by about 2 to 3, which is more than two standard deviations greater than the average number of strikes between any two countries in a given year.
THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES
Terrorism is adopted from the ITERATE data set -see Mickolus et al (1993) . The ITERATE project began as an attempt to quantify characteristics, activities and impacts of transnational terrorist groups. The data set is grouped into four categories.
First, there are incident characteristics which code the timing of each event. Second, Markusen and Maskus (2001a,b) who investigated gravity models for FDI. Blomberg and Hess (2004) focus on trade, especially on comparing the costs of con ‡ict to measures for trade promotion.
Alternatively, Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) investigate the impact of various forms of con ‡ict such as terrorism, internal wars and external wars on a country's economic growth.
the terrorist characteristics yield information about the number, makeup and groups involved in the incidents. Third, victim characteristics describe analogous information on the victims involved in the attacks. Finally, life and property losses attempt to quantify the damage of the attack.
A central contribution of our paper is to employ the data in a di¤erent manner than has been previously employed in the literature. We consider a bilateral de…nition of terrorism, which we measure in a number of ways. First, we measure terrorism,
T , as the number of events in a host country, h, from attackers whose nationality comes from source country, s. Second, we de…ne terrorism as the number of events perpetrated on individuals from host country, h, from attackers whose nationality comes from source country s. In addition, we measure T as the number of victims rather than number of incidents in a given year.
We present several caveats before we proceed. First, one may be concerned that the nationality of the source attacker may not represent the views of the country for which he is associated. While this is possibly true, this problem is no less severe than what we encounter when we try to measure any international variable. How do we properly account for a Mercedes manufactured in Alabama using parts imports from Asia, for example? Second, one may be concerned that there may be more than one nationality included in the attacking force. So, how does one decide which country responsible for the attack? While this is a serious consideration in theory, this turns out to be less of issue in practice as 98 percent of attacks are reported with only one source country. Finally, one may be concerned that we may be undercounting the number of incidents as not all attacks are identi…ed with a particular group. Even so, the vast majority of attacks do have an identi…ed source country, amounting to over 8,000 incidents. A central contribution of this paper is to introduce transnational terrorism T as the dependent variable into these various gravity models. To include T in the aforementioned approaches, consider the following gravity equation for log trade (x hst ) for country pair h; s at time t and its determinants:
where Y is log of real GDP, Z is a vector of observables to include trade costs (e.g. distance and language barriers), p are multilateral resistance terms such as prices, which refer to the bilateral barrier between countries relative to the average trade barrier each country faces with all trading partners. These multilateral resistance terms may be thought of as product variables that create wedges to trade.
For traditional trade gravity models, one representation of equation (1) is (suppressing time subscripts for convenience):
where y is the log of real GDP per capita, Z is a vector of variables including distance (both physical and technological measures) and language barriers and the error may be speci…ed to control for random or time/country …xed e¤ects. We modify equation (2) by specifying Z and rede…ning the left-hand-side variable as T , so that we have:
+ 6 Comlang hs + 7 area hs + 8 DEM ht + 9 DEM st + 10 GLO ht + 11 GLO st + " ijt where h; s denote countries, t denotes time, and the variables are de…ned as: T is the number of a terrorist attacks on country h from group representing country s, Y is log of real Gross Domestic Product, y is the log of real GDP per capita, logdistance is the natural log of distance between two countries, Comlang is a dummy variable which is 1 if countries have a common language and 0 otherwise, area is the natural log of the product of the size of the countries, DEM is de…ned both as an index of democratization from polity and as a dummy variable if the country is a democracy, GLO is de…ned both as trade/GDP and an index of integration such as trade or participation in the WTO. 4 The purpose of estimating the gravity equation would be to consider the importance of DEM and GLO in impacting the likelihood of terrorism and to compare the relative magnitude to other factors highlighted in Blomberg and Hess (2005b) as relevant in explaining terrorism e.g. GDP per capita.
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It is also worthwhile to note that many of the bilateral con ‡ict observations are zero. To correctly estimate the elasticities, then, it is necessary to consider the bias on account of censoring. We employ the Tobit model that estimates the coe¢ cients through a maximum likelihood procedure.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Cross-Country Empirical Motivation
We begin motivating our discussion by considering the link between con ‡ict that occurs within a county's borders from outsiders and con ‡ict that occurs by the citizens of a country in other countries. In a crude way we are examining terrorist imports and terrorist exports. The purpose of this preliminary exercise is to see if the same coun-tries that experience signi…cant international con ‡ict are those countries whose citizens are terrorizing abroad. This is useful, because it may shed some light into some of the causes of terror: whether con ‡ict is driven by civil strife between countries who may have been given arbitrary borders by colonial powers; whether con ‡ict is linked to particular countries such as the United States that may have very strong international policies; whether con ‡ict is due to globalization/democratization/development such that those countries are more apt to be net importers than net exporters. There are also several notable net exporters of con ‡ict-Ireland, Iran, and Cuba.
While there may be many factors that shift countries away from the diagonal line, it is interesting to note that the net importers mentioned are clearly more democratic and developed than the net exporters. We denote the least democratic/developed/open countries with dots. Most appear to be net exporters of con ‡ict. Hence, when developing our gravity model, it would appear that the traditional variables included in gravity models would also apply to con ‡ict-namely income, trade and institutions.
This can be seen once we do the same experiment controlling for democracy, openness and income. In this case, there does not appear to be such a di¤erence in estimated imports or exports from con ‡ict. Figure 2 plots this conditional regression.
Notice that in this case there are just as many dots below and above the estimated line. Interestingly, it is still estimated to be a 45 degree line.
Figure 2 about here
While these …gures may be illuminating, they do not provide any direct evidence regarding the relationship between globalization, democratization and transnational terrorism. The problem we argue in this paper, is that this data con ‡ates the characteristics of the host with the characteristics of the source country. As a gross …rst cut at the problem, we simply divide the data along source and host country lines. In Table 1 , a clearer picture emerges. The number of terrorist incidents by source country is larger when the source is non-democratic and closed (especially after 1970); the number of incidents by host, conversely is larger in democracies and in open, globalized societies (although this association appears somewhat less strongly in the recent period). These observations of course, do not control for a number of factors that may be associated both with democracy and globalization. In the sections that follow, we add those controls and o¤er a more thorough analysis. 
Baseline Results
We begin by explaining the results from estimating the gravity model, (3). In Table   2 , terrorism is measured by the number of incidents by location; our globalization variable is OP EN which is imports and exports as a percentage of GDP to and from all countries in columns 4, 6 and 8; we also use an alternative measure of globalization by examining participation in the WTO and the IMF as indicators of commercial integration (Columns 5, 7 and 8). DEM is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the country's polity measure in that year is larger than 7, or the sum of legislative and executive veto points is larger than 14. Columns 1-7 include variables that do not change over time. These include distance, land mass, as well as dummy variables for language. Column 8 estimates the model to include controls for time. Column 9 estimates the model to control for random e¤ects by country-pair. Each of these models are estimated using the Tobit estimator with standard errors clustered by the income level of each country-pair.
Consider, …rst, the traditional gravity variables. Greater distance between the source and host countries reduces con ‡ict (as has been well documented for trade and FDI). Traditional barriers to trade such as borders and language also appear to increase con ‡ict. In this sense, con ‡ict appears to be more of a regional threat than a global one.
Larger country size (higher GDP) increases con ‡ict. One way to interpret this result is that larger means more of everything-including con ‡ict. Even so, con ‡ict is signi…cantly more responsive to country size at the host rather than from the source perspective.
But perhaps the most interesting and robust result is when analyzing di¤erences in income. Richer host countries (higher per capita GDP) generate more con ‡ict whereas richer source countries generate less con ‡ict. This result is consistent across each speci…cation with the impact from source income being slightly greater in magnitude than the impact from host income. Taken literally, the estimation results from Table 1 imply that a one percentage increase in a source countries income should decrease the number of terrorist events by 2 per year. A one percentage increase in host country income would invite about 1 more terrorist event per year.
This …nding provides a segue into the thrust of our paper's main question. This result might mean that con ‡ict is the unfortunate consequence of the divide between rich and poor countries. During a process of sweeping change over the past 20 years as countries have become more globalized and democratized, some countries have been "left behind" while others have ‡ourished. Perhaps, terrorists in these "left behind" economies has chosen to strike against those countries that have become more advantaged during the period in question.
We directly address this point as we consider the e¤ect of these dynamic forcesglobalization and democratization-on con ‡ict. There are two main results from this estimation. First, the advent of democratic institutions in a source country signi…cantly reduces con ‡ict. However, the advent of these same institutions in host countries actually increases con ‡ict, providing more support for our conjectures.
Second, source-country openness has a negative and statistically signi…cant impact on con ‡ict. Once again, however, host-country openness often has a positive and statistically signi…cant on con ‡ict. Ceteris paribus, the impact of being a democracy or participating in the WTO for a source country decreases the number of terrorist strikes by about 1 to 2, which is more than two standard deviations greater than the average number of strikes between any two countries in a given year.
Moreover, as the results in Table 3 demonstrate, our baseline estimates of the traditional gravity speci…cation in (3) reported in Table 2 are generally robust across modi…cations to take into account region, time and income class. Columns 1 through 6 of Table 2 report the results from a gravity speci…cation where we include dummy variables for globalization and democratization in each speci…cation.
7 Table 3 about here
Greater distance, borders and language appear to have similar statistically signi…-cant impacts in Table 3 . In this way, con ‡ict appears to be more regional than global.
Larger country size continues to increase con ‡ict. Richer host countries continue to generate more con ‡ict in each case except when only rich countries are considered. Poorer source countries continue to generate more con ‡ict.
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Finally, and most importantly, the impact on globalization and democratization continues to hold as well. As can be seen from the appropriate rows of the table, the estimate associated with host democracy is statistically signi…cant at below the 0:01 
ROBUSTNESS ACROSS MEASURES OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
In contrast to the previous section where we de…ned host con ‡ict from the perspective of the location of the event, we now de…ne host con ‡ict by the nationality of the attacked victim. In national income accounting terms, we consider a nationality measure of host/source con ‡ict rather than a location measure of host/source con ‡ict described above. We employ the exact same speci…cation as in Table 2 . We …nd that in general, the coe¢ cients have the same sign, of similar magnitude, and statistically signi…cance as those in Table 1 . Table 4 about here
The remarkable similarity in results between Tables 4 and 2 also give us some information about possible measurement error. As discussed earlier, there may be some concerns that we are unable to capture the intent of the terrorist given the inherent challenges to using media-based measures of con ‡ict. Yet, when we select a di¤erent way of measuring the target for con ‡ict, namely by the nationality of the victim, we get precisely the same results. Obviously, this cannot account for all the possible problems associated with measuring con ‡ict, but it is remarkable how similar are the results. Other possible measurement issues are analyzed in Tables 5 and 6 . In Table 5 , we consider a di¤erent measure of con ‡ict to account for the intensity of the violence. In this case, we de…ne con ‡ict as the number of victims rather than the number of incidents. 10 The advantage to considering this measure is that it may better account for the actual damage of each attack in ‡icted on its country.
The disadvantage would be that often terrorists may be less interested in targeting victims than in getting a response from its target. At the very least, it provides a robustness check to our early results.
The results in Table 5 continue to support the earlier …ndings. The sign and statistical signi…cance of each relevant coe¢ cient is similar to those discussed earlier.
However, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients associated with income per capita, globalization and democratization are slightly larger-on the order of 10 percent greater.
Since the left-hand side variables in both Tables 3 and 4 have been scaled to be of similar magnitude, one can only conclude that the impact of these variables is greater on the number of victims than it is on the number of incidents.
To place some magnitude on these results, a one percentage increase in income in a host country causes the number of victims to rise by about 1. A one percentage point increase in the income of the source country causes the number of victims to fall by approximately 2. The advent of a democracy or participation in the WTO in a host country causes the number of victims to double to 2. Participation in the WTO in a source country causes the number of victims to fall twofold or by about 2. These results mirror those found in Table 5 . However, the magnitudes are di¤erent.
It appears that being a democracy for the source country has a greater e¤ect than in the full sample. It also appears that United States creates a larger target due to its democratic policies. Finally, is appears that openness provides a greater hedge to terrorist attacks from source countries than in the previous regressions.
CONCLUSION
We construct a new database on bilateral con ‡ict and estimate a gravity model for con ‡ict. We …nd that development, democracy and openness are each positive in ‡uences in creating a more peaceful environment for an attacking country. We also …nd that these same factors in a target country can actually encourage con ‡ict.
What do these results mean for policy-makers? Our paper is one of the …rst of its kind to document the need for development, democracy and openness in encouraging peace for terrorist nations. This means that policies that can encourage more liberal institutions to facilitate political and economic freedom in countries that are traditionally sources for transnational terrorism will have a pacifying in ‡uence. This lends support to policy e¤orts designed to export democracy to terrorist states may be bene…cial. This work also puts to rest the notion that arguments about globalization, in the form of globalization creating "relative deprivation" or "increased inequality"
and hence a rich source for terrorist recruitment and export are not substantiated by the data. This work suggests an heretofore unheralded virtue of globalization, and more speci…cally, integration into the world economic community of terrorism-source states as having a bene…cial impact on reducing exports of transnational terrorism.
Unfortunately, our paper also points to the fact that the countries that tend to be more politically and economically free are more likely to be targets of terrorists.
Clearly, reducing the degree of democracy in these countries is not a policy option.
Slowing the process of globalization, a topic that frequently emerges from those disadvantaged from openness, may not reduce terrorism in the importing countriesreductions in openness in those countries may reduce the degree of integration of the source countries too; the net e¤ect is not clear.
More realistically, these countries must be prepared to invest more heavily in counter-terrorist measures for a defensive posture, and to engage in comprehensive cooperation to avoid simply shifting the incidence of the attacks from more secure to less secure globalized democracies. Each column provides the mean number of incidents for sub-sampled decades during . Column 1 provides the average across all countries during the sub-sampled time period. Columns 2 -5 provide averages from the location of the incident or host country. Columns 6 -9 provide the averages from the nationality of the terrorist or source country. Column 2,6 provides the averages for democracies (DEM is dummy variable which is 1 if polity > 7 or executive + legislative veto points > 14, 0 otherwise) and Column 3,7 provides the remaining non-democracies N ODEM . Column 4,8 provides averages for more OP EN countries (OP EN is total trade/GDP > 30) and Column 5,9 provides the remaining closed economies (CLOSED). 
